Rolling again.Three parts of the soul, according to Plato.
- Appetitive part, the appetites. The lowest, basest part of the soul. The part that wants things, particularly physical things
- Spirit/Will, the middle part which does things. The motive part of the soul.
- Intellect, the rational, reasoning part of the soul. The highest part of the soul. The part which can make plans and decisions about what to do
Each section of the soul has its associated virtue to perfect it.
- The virtue of the appetites is Temperance. Temperance is having appetites which are obedient to reason; wanting things the right amount, instead of too much or not enough.
- The virtue of the spirit is Courage. Courage is forbearance in the face of danger, fear, or obstacle; courage is being able to direct the spirit, rather than being pulled helplessly by it.
- The virtue of intellect is Wisdom. Wisdom is knowing or discerning what is good in any situation; wisdom is what allows one to decide on the right thing between unequal alternatives.
- The fourth virtue is Justice. Justice is the virtue of having virtues; it is the quality of having the other three virtues working smoothly and not interfering with each other. Justice is excellence in function or operation.
The Doctrine of Analogy
Any statement of logical fact contains a subject and a predicate. Assigning the predicate to an appropriate subject is called “predicating” it.
Predicates can be assigned to subjects in three different ways.
- Univocal predication. With one voice. Some predicate is assigned to some subjects in exactly the same way. “Lassie is a dog.” “Benji is a dog.” Differences between the subjects can exist, but the sameness is found apart from the differences.
- Equivocal predication. With many voices, in many ways. Some predicate is assigned to some subjects in completely different ways. No sameness whatsoever is implied. “That container is a tank.” “That armored vehicle is a tank.”
- Analogical predication. Some predicate is assigned to some subjects in exactly the same way. However, in analogical predication, the sameness predicated is found within the differences of the subject. “Elvis is great.” “George Foreman is great.”
Analogical predication is what we’re concerned about. The thing which is predicated of each subject is the “analagon”. The subjects or instances existing with that predicate are the “analagates”.
Talking about Aristotle now.
Aristotle thought ethics was about finding a balance between extremes. He claimed that virtue was the mean between two extremes of possibility. Too little of a virtuous quality was a defect of character; too much was an excess. This was not a single arithmetic value; it was a floating mid-point based on situation. In one situation, courage might require taking one action, and in another situation courage might require the opposite action. Virtue is always finding the right mean for the situation.
Aristotle did not hold to the Platonic model of having four virtues. Aristotle claimed there were as many virtues as there were appetites.
When all the virtues are at their appropriate means, Aristotle claimed that one had attained “natural perfection”, or Eudaimonia. Fullness of being, maximum perfection in every respect.
There are four possible states to Eudimonia
- Virtue — The highest state. You see the good, you immediately want the good, and you are effortlessly (without internal conflict) able to do the good, in every situation.
- Continence — The second, lesser stage. You see the good, you want the good, and you do the good, but doing the good requires effort; there is internal conflict there.
- Incontinence — The third, even lesser stage. You see the good, you want the good, but you are too weak to do the good. The desire to do something other than the good overwhelms your desire to do the good.
- Vice — The least stage. You no longer see the good. Because of this, you no longer can want the good, and so will not do the good. Aristotle held that this stage was irredeemable. There is no natural hope for you.